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“Reflect” is the important word.  
C. S. LEWIS* 
  
 
 1. THE HISTORIOGRAPHICAL DEBATE 
 
Among Jean Bodin’s lesser-known contributions to Renaissance philosophy are his remarks 
on the vexata quaestio of action and contemplation, a classic dilemma of Western thought since 
the time of Plato and Aristotle. Rekindled in the early Renaissance by humanists such as 
Petrarch and Leonardo Bruni, the debate continued to occupy philosophers and intellectuals 
well into the seventeenth century.1 Bodin first addressed this topic at length in his Methodus of 
1566 and then returned to it several times throughout his long and productive career: in his 
République of 1576, which he himself translated into Latin in 1586; in his Colloquium 
Heptaplomeres, probably composed in the late 1580s-early 1590s but never printed until 1857; 
and, finally, in his Universae naturae theatrum and Paradoxon, his last published works, which 
appeared just months before his death in June 1596. (A French version of the Paradoxon, 
penned by Bodin himself, was published posthumously in 1598.)  
 In all of these works, Bodin discussed the question of which form of life is better and 
worthier, the active or the contemplative. To him – trained in his youth as a Carmelite novice 
and brought up in the values of this contemplative eremitical order, only to then pursue a very 
active public career as a barrister in the Paris parlement, a royal official, and a close counsellor 
to the royal family – the dilemma must have presented itself with particular urgency. Bodin’s 
entire life bears witness to a strong determination to reconcile otium and negotium on both a 
personal and a theoretical level, but also to an acute awareness of the magnitude of this task. 
As Bodin himself wrote in the Paradoxon, the puzzle of action and contemplation was like a 
«rock» (scopulus) against which legions of experienced philosophers from Aristotle onwards 
had previously «crashed their ships» (plerique navim afflixerunt).2 As he reviewed the 
solutions put forward by some of these philosophers in his Methodus and République, Bodin 
did not hide his dissatisfaction but he also did not offer a clear solution of his own. His stance 
                                                
* C. S. Lewis, Suprised by Joy: The Shape of My Early Life (London: Collins, 2012), p. 194. I am grateful to Jill 
Kraye and David Lines for helpful comments on previous drafts of this article, and to David also for kindly sharing 
a draft of his forthcoming entry on action and contemplation for the Encyclopedia of Renaissance Philosophy (see 
below). 
1 For a survey that includes a rich bibliography of primary and secondary sources, see David A. Lines, “Action 
and Contemplation in Renaissance Philosophy”, forthcoming in Encyclopedia of Renaissance Philosophy, ed. 
Marco Sgarbi (Dordrecht: Springer). See also the classic study by Paul Oskar Kristeller, “The Active and 
Contemplative Life in Renaissance Humanism”, in Studies in Renaissance Thought and Letters, vol. 4 (Rome: 
Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1996), pp. 192-213. While it does not mention Bodin, the section on 
“Kontemplations- und Liebes-Ethik (Ficino, Landino, Ficino-Schule)” in Thomas Leinkauf, Grundriss 
Philosophie des Humanismus und der Renaissance (1350-1600), vol. 1 (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2017), 
pp. 725-737, provides some essential background for the matters discussed in this article. 
2 Jean Bodin, Paradoxon, in Paradosso della virtù, ed. Andrea Suggi (Milan: Aragno, 2009), p. 62. All translations 
are mine unless otherwise noted. For the sake of space I shall generally quote from the Latin version alone (which 
is more concise and also usually more technical), except in those few instances where the Latin differs 
significantly from the French, in which case I shall provide both versions. I defer a systematic comparison of the 
two texts to an in-progress study of philosophical self-translations in Renaissance France.  
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on the question remains indeed so elusive that modern interpreters have come to opposite 
conclusions. Of the two scholars who have examined the issue in more depth, one, Margherita 
Isnardi Parente, saw a clear shift in Bodin’s ideas on the matter and argued that his ideal became 
increasingly contemplative over the years, as a result of his growing skepticism towards active 
political life during the most dramatic phases of the Wars of Religion.3 Paul L. Rose, on the 
other hand, firmly rejected the idea of a disengaged mature Bodin.4 He not only suggested that 
Bodin retained a strong interest in active politics until the end; he also argued that Bodin never 
changed his mind on the question of action and contemplation, fundamentally remaining 
faithful to his early allegiance to Varro’s “mixed” ideal of a life in which action and 
contemplation each have a role to play.5  
 What we have here is a radical alternative between a discontinuist assessment of 
Bodin’s intellectual evolution (Isnardi Parente) and one that stresses overall continuity over 
change (Rose), at least for what concerns Bodin’s stance on the specific issue of action and 
contemplation.6 It is true that part of the disagreement might come from the different sources 
on which Rose and Isnardi Parente chose to base their respective analyses. While Isnardi 
Parente relied solely on the Methodus and the République for her reconstruction, Rose 
examined the whole span of Bodin’s oeuvre, from his second earliest published work (the 1559 
Oratio de instituenda in republica juventute) to his very last (the Theatrum and the Paradoxon), 
without neglecting supposedly minor texts such as the Sapientiae moralis epitome of 1588 and 
various letters from Bodin’s youth and old age.7 Curiously though, Rose, who took into account 
the longer time span, also put forward the more strongly continuist interpretation, while Isnardi 
Parente, who focused on works relatively close to each other in time, identified a deep gulf 
between them. One would have expected the opposite outcome if their only grounds for 
disagreement had been the different time span that they each took into account. Surely, then, 
the roots of their divergence must lie elsewhere.  
 Bodin himself, I suggest, can teach us where. At a crucial moment in his Paradoxon, 
he makes an illuminating remark about the importance of semantic accuracy in philosophical 
debate. One of the reasons why philosophers have fought so hard over action and 
contemplation is, he says, the wide range of meanings that the term contemplation 
(contemplatio, contemplation) has accrued over time. Contemplation can be taken to mean 
                                                
3 Margherita Isnardi Parente, “Introduzione”, in Jean Bodin, I sei libri dello Stato, vol. 1, ed. Margherita Isnardi 
Parente (Turin: UTET, 1964), pp. 14-17; “A proposito di un’interpretazione cinquecentesca del rapporto teoria-
prassi in Aristotele e Platone”, La parola dal testo 87 (1962): 436-447.  
4 Paul L. Rose, Bodin and The Great God of Nature: The Moral and Religious Universe of a Judaiser (Geneva: 
Droz, 1980), p. 98. Rose does not explicitly engage with Isnardi Parente’s theory of Bodin’s “contemplative turn”; 
he also never cites Isnardi Parente’s “Introduzione”, which is where she expounds this theory most clearly. He 
does however cite other publications where she discusses Bodin’s views on action and contemplation: “A 
proposito di un’interpretazione”, in particular, is cited on p. 49, n. 22.  
5 Rose, Bodin and the Great God of Nature, pp. 96-98. 
6 Scholars coming after Isnardi Parente and Rose have tended to follow one or the other of these interpretations: 
for instance, Girolamo Cotroneo and Howell Lloyd have taken sides with Isnardi Parente, while Anna Maria 
Lazzarino del Grosso has favoured Rose’s continuist view. See: Girolamo Cotroneo, “Ancora sui rapporti fra la 
Methodus e la République”, Il pensiero politico 14/1 (1981): 18-25 (esp. 19-20); Howell A. Lloyd, Jean Bodin, 
‘This Pre-Eminent Man of France’: An Intellectual Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), Chapter 
9 (“Vita Contemplativa”); Anna Maria Lazzarino del Grosso, “Per una storia delle idee sull’adozione nella Francia 
moderna: Jean Bodin”, in Studi politici in onore di Luigi Firpo, ed. Silvia Rota Ghibaudi and Franco Barcia, vol. 
1 (Milan: Franco Angeli, 1990), p. 693. A slightly different solution (though closer overall to Isnardi Parente than 
to Rose) is offered in Marie-Dominique Couzinet, Sub specie hominis: Études sur le savoir humain au XVIe siècle 
(Paris: Vrin, 2007), p. 98. 
7 These letters were first published by Jean Moreau Reibel, “Bodin et la Ligue d’après de lettres inédites”, 
Humanisme et Renaissance 2 (1935): 422-440. They were then reprinted in Jean Bodin, Selected Writings on 
Philosophy, Religion and Politics, ed. Paul Lawrence Rose (Geneva: Droz, 1980). This collection also contains 
both versions (Latin and French) of the Paradoxon; however, no English translation is provided. 
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many things, from careful study of the physical world to meditation over abstract concepts and 
introspective examination; some even use it – not quite to Bodin’s satisfaction, as we shall see 
– to denote our enjoyment (fruitio, ioüissance) of God. Such semantic richness, which Bodin 
equates with vagueness, has led philosophers into endless disputes, as they inadvertently use 
the word in different ways and therefore fail to understand one another. What Bodin is 
suggesting here is not that the whole historical debate on action and contemplation should be 
discarded as one big misunderstanding. There is of course much more at stake for him in this 
debate than a simple question of semantics. His point is that the terms in which the question 
has traditionally been posed are not conducive to finding a solution; if anything, they 
complicate matters further. The debate over action and contemplation is, in this sense, a 
question mal posée, and Bodin’s first and chief contribution – as he himself sees it, and as I 
shall attempt to show in this article – is that of bringing some clarity to the matter.8  
 The problem is that Bodin himself had not always been so consistent in his use of terms. 
It actually testifies to his earnestness that throughout his career he would change his mind not 
only on the relative value of action and contemplation, but also on what these words mean in 
the first place: his philosophical rigour compelled him to keep the question open until a 
satisfactory solution was found – and, meanwhile, to go on testing and trying. The result for us 
is that we cannot just take for granted that “contemplation” means the same thing in Bodin’s 
earlier works as it does in the later ones. The interpretive disagreement between Isnardi Parente 
and Rose might have something to do with this. Rose, though he took into account the whole 
span of Bodin’s oeuvre (including the Paradoxon), was evidently more focused on content than 
on the vocabulary used to express it, and thus he failed to notice Bodin’s lexical mise-à-point 
and the conceptual consequences that came with it. His continuist reading of Bodin’s position 
on action and contemplation, as we shall see, does not withstand the test of close textual 
analysis, although his work has a number of other important merits.9 Isnardi Parente, on the 
other hand, offered a convincing, philology-based examination of Bodin’s intellectual 
evolution on this matter between the Methodus and the République. But since the most 
remarkable change in his attitude to the problem took place after the République, her 
reconstruction fails to cover it and needs to be complemented by further study.  
 With this article, I would like to offer a re-examination of Bodin’s position on action 
and contemplation which, like Isnardi Parente’s, pays close attention to Bodin’s philosophical 
vocabulary but, like Rose’s, takes into account a longer arc of his writing. My analysis will 
revolve around three main works: the Methodus, the République, and the Paradoxon, although 
it could (and should) be fruitfully extended to other works by Bodin in the future. Although the 
Paradoxon (in both its Latin and French versions) was the last of these three works to be 
published, it is also a particularly good place to start, as it is in this text that Bodin criticizes 
previous thinkers for using the word contemplation inconsistently and then sets out to seek a 
new term that may aptly designate the «consideration of the highest and most eminent being» 
(inspectio nobilissimae ac praestantissimae rei), that is God.10 This divine contemplation 
Bodin chooses to call «reflection» (actus reflexus in Latin, reflexion in French), in order to 
                                                
8 This Aristotelian call for definitional precision may seem rather ironic in a work that purports to be (and indeed 
is on many levels) a thorough rejection of Aristotle’s ethics. It is, however, the exact same move that Bodin adopts 
in the Methodus and in the République with regards to Aristotle’s politics (I refer for this to my article 
“Sovereignty, Territory, and Population in Jean Bodin’s République”, French Studies 72/1 (2018): 17-34, esp. 20-
23). More needs to be said about Bodin’s appropriation of Aristotelian strategies within the context of a systematic 
critique of Aristotle’s philosophy; for a helpful starting point, see Giuseppe Cambiano, Polis. Un modello per la 
cultura europea (Bari and Rome: Laterza, 2000) pp. 133-167. 
9 See David B. Ruderman’s helpful review of Rose’s book, which appeared in Renaissance Quarterly 35/2 (1982): 
284-287. 
10 Bodin, Paradoxon, p. 40. 
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distinguish it more clearly from contemplation proper, which for him consists exclusively in 
the observation of lower and impermanent realities (res terrestres et fluxae).11  
 This word, reflection, is an interesting choice. Why did Bodin choose it? What exactly 
did he mean by it? Why did he find it helpful for clarifying the question of action and 
contemplation? Was he the first to use the word in this context, or was he drawing on other 
sources – and if so, which ones? We do not currently have an answer to these questions, 
although helpful clues can be found in two studies by Pierre Mesnard and Marie-Dominique 
Couzinet respectively.12 To the best of my knowledge, Mesnard and Couzinet are the only ones 
who have paid any attention at all to Bodin’s theory of reflection, followed more recently by 
Howell Lloyd who, however, only mentioned it in passing and without identifying it as a 
coherent theory.13 While Mesnard and Couzinet focused primarily on the ethical implications 
of Bodin’s theory of reflection, in this article I shall explore two further and interrelated 
dimensions of this theory: its ties to Bodin’s theology and spirituality, on the one hand, and its 
repercussions on the debate over action and contemplation, on the other.14 I shall also 
investigate in some depth the question of Bodin’s sources, which has hitherto remained 
completely unaddressed.  
   
2. FROM CONTEMPLATION TO REFLECTION  
 
Bodin’s Paradoxon takes the form of a dialogue between a father and a son working together 
through a series of complex moral and theological questions. Writing on such topics in the 
middle of a civil war – much of the work was composed in 1591, in one of the most dramatic 
phases of the French wars of religion – did not amount for Bodin to a form of escapism: as he 
explains in his preface to the Latin version, dedicated to the young son of the then secretary of 
State Louis Potier,15 the discussion around «virtue and the greatest good and evil» (de virtutibus 
ac finibus bonorum et malorum) is the most vital one to have when civil society breaks down 
and the only hope for the future lies in educating the young.16 In this sense, the Paradoxon 
pursues the same kind of direct intervention in contemporary matters that Bodin had previously 
sought to make with political works such as the République; what is new is that he now 
perceives the scale and depth of the crisis to be such that no political solution will help unless 
it is accompanied by a complete rethinking of the ethical foundations of human life. Thus, what 
Bodin offers in the Paradoxon is a reconsideration of some classic questions of moral 
philosophy that are to a certain extent perennial but also carry a special importance for the 
current crisis in France. 
                                                
11 Ibid.  
12 Pierre Mesnard, “Jean Bodin et la critique de la morale d’Aristote”, Revue thomiste 49 (1949): 542-562 (esp. 
548-550); Marie-Dominique Couzinet, “La philosophie morale de Jean Bodin dans le Paradoxe de 1596. 
Hypothèse de lecture”, in L’Œuvre de Jean Bodin. Actes du colloque tenu à Lyon à l’occasion du quatrième 
centenaire de sa mort (11-13 janvier 1996) (Paris: Champion, 2004), pp. 367-383. A revised version of this article 
is reprinted in Couzinet, Sub specie hominis, pp. 105-123. 
13 Lloyd, Jean Bodin, p. 234. As the rest of this article will show, I respectfully disagree with Lloyd’s interpretation 
of Bodin’s notions of contemplation and reflection. Lloyd argues that Bodin understands contemplation of earthly 
things as passive and «reflection» of higher realities as active; I believe that Bodin’s texts indicate the opposite.  
14 Couzinet does pay some attention to the theological dimension, but only with regard to whether the fruitio Dei 
that Bodin has in mind results from an act of the intellect or of the will (Sub specie hominis, pp. 111-112). This 
point will be discussed in sections 2 and 3 below. Couzinet also makes an interesting remark about contemplation 
and ecstasy in “Histoire et méthode chez Bodin”, Il pensiero politico, 30/2 (1997): 217-232 (esp. 230-231). 
15 See Andrea Suggi, “Introduzione”, in Bodin, Paradosso sulla virtù, p. XI. 
16 Bodin, Paradoxon, p. 8 (note the evident Ciceronian flavour in Bodin’s words). For interesting insights about 
Bodin’s views on pedagogy, see Pierre Mesnard, “Jean Bodin devant le problème de l’éducation”, Recueil de 
travaux de l’Académie des Sciences morales et politiques, 112 (1959): 217-228. 
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 First and foremost among these questions is that of the greatest good: what is it and 
how can we reach it? The Paradoxon opens precisely on this question, and on the son’s great 
surprise in discovering that his father’s views on the matter seem to contradict common 
opinion. He recalls his father saying that «the greatest and highest good of man does not consist 
in the action of virtue», nor virtue itself «in a mean»; he is shocked now to find that this is a 
great paradox (literally, “against common opinion”) unwelcome to most.17 The son’s request 
for clarification gradually leads him and his father into a wide-ranging philosophical discussion 
that betrays the father’s (and Bodin’s) anti-Aristotelian inclinations at each turn. For of course 
it is Aristotle who defines virtue as a mean between two extremes of vice.18 And it is again 
Aristotle who identifies man’s highest good with happiness and happiness with «activity in 
accordance with virtue» (ἐνέργεια κατ᾿ ἀρετήν).19 In contesting this latter point in particular, 
Bodin was well aware of taking issue with a tenet of Aristotelian ethics that had fuelled debate 
for centuries – and still does. Scholars of Aristotle have often been puzzled by his position on 
the greatest good since it appears to involve a contradiction: how can Aristotle’s identification 
of happiness with morally virtuous activity in Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics be reconciled 
with his praise of contemplation (θεωρία) as the highest form of life in Book X? If man’s 
greatest good consists in moral action, how can it also consist in a life of pure contemplation? 
Is contemplation not the opposite of action? As Stephen S. Bush observes, Aristotle’s words 
raise questions «about the status of morally virtuous activity and about the relation between 
that activity and contemplation».20  
 Bodin would have agreed with Aristotle’s modern interpreters in finding this point 
perplexing. In both his Methodus and République he had pondered over the apparent 
contradiction between Politics I and VII, where Aristotle seems to favour an active life (βίος 
πρακτικός), and Nicomachean Ethics X, where he praises the contemplative life (βίος 
θεωρητικός) instead.21 The matter, Bodin notes in the Methodus, is especially sensitive because 
if we accept that contemplation is man’s greatest good, then we must also accept that individual 
good and common good do not coincide: for clearly a state could never survive if all of its 
members devoted themselves to pure intellectual pursuits.22 This is yet again a classic 
Aristotelian question (discussed in Nicomachean Ethics I and Politics VII) that Bodin thinks 
                                                
17 «Valde novum plerisque visum est quod ita pridem abs te, Pater optime, audivi cum diceres nec ullam virtutem 
in mediocritate, nec summum hominis extremumque bonum in virtutis actione consistere […]. Libenter cum bona 
tua venia peterem […] ut quid de virtutibus deque bonorum et malorum finibus sentias explicare velis.» (Bodin, 
Paradoxon, p. 10). 
18 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, II.5-9, 1106a14 – 1109b26. 
19 Nicomachean Ethics, X.7, 1177a12. At I.6, 1098a16-17, Aristotle had defined happiness more specifically as 
an «activity of the soul in accordance with virtue» (ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατ᾿ ἀρετήν), which already brings us closer 
to the question of the contemplative life. Note that this definition is actually partial: for Aristotle virtue alone does 
not suffice for happiness (this was instead the Stoic position); one must also enjoy a range of «external goods» 
(τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά), such as health and wealth, which are recognized as preconditions for true and complete 
happiness (Nicomachean Ethics, I.11, 1100b22 – 1101a16). Bodin’s Aristotle is therefore (at least in this case) a 
rather Stoicized Aristotle.  
20 Stephen S. Bush, “Divine and Human Happiness in Nicomachean Ethics”, The Philosophical Review 117/1 
(2008): 49-75 (esp. 49). See also David Roochnik, “What is Theoria? Nicomachean Ethics Book 10.7–8”, 
Classical Philology 104/1 (2009): 69-82. Note that Aristotle’s text literally says «virtuous activity» (or, better 
still, «activity according to virtue»), not «morally virtuous activity»; the door is left open for a possible 
interpretation of this activity in terms of intellectual virtue. To translate ἀρετή as moral virtue is to over-interpret 
Aristotle’s text and thus potentially to overemphasize the contradiction between his accounts of praxis in Books 
1 and 10 of the Nicomachean Ethics. However, since Bodin also clearly interprets this passage in terms of moral 
virtue and not just of virtue in general, I have found it helpful to report a contemporary interpretation that frames 
the question in similar terms.   
21 See Isnardi Parente, “A proposito di un’interpretazione” and “Introduzione”. 
22 Jean Bodin, Methodus ad facilem historiarum cognitionem, ed. Sara Miglietti (Pisa: Edizioni della Normale, 
2013), III.16, p. 128.  
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the philosopher framed well but was ultimately unable to solve: «Aristotle was deeply troubled 
by this difficult point, nor could he disentangle himself from it».23 
 Bodin’s own solution in the Methodus is the same as that of the ancient Roman scholar 
Varro, which he would have found in Augustine: «If we want the same thing to be good for the 
single individual and for the whole community, then we must identify the good of the living 
man neither with contemplation nor with action, but with a mix of both».24 Note that for Bodin 
this ideal refers specifically to man in his earthly state (bonum hominis vitam agentis). A life 
of pure contemplation would not even be viable for man in this life, as even the most 
contemplative individual has bodily needs to attend to: as Bodin points out, «the soul cannot 
enjoy pure contemplation until it is completely detached from the body».25 This apparently 
incidental remark is in fact crucial, as Bodin’s change of heart on this point will lead him in 
due course to reconsider the whole issue of action and contemplation. Such a change is already 
visible in the République: here again Bodin draws attention to Aristotle’s internal 
contradictions before pointing to Varro’s mixed ideal as a possible solution, except that in this 
case Bodin ends up rejecting the Varronian compromise that he had previously accepted:  
 
Marcus Varro had happiness consist in [a mix of] action and contemplation; in my opinion, he should 
have said that although the life of man needs both action and contemplation, his supreme good consists 
in contemplation, which the Academics have called “the pleasant death” and the Jews “the precious 
death”, because it steals the soul from the mud of the body in order to deify it.26 
 
Isnardi Parente was right to see a shift between the Methodus and the République: as this 
passage shows, Bodin’s ideal in the latter work is certainly more contemplative than in the 
former. But the way in which this shift took place is almost as important as the shift itself. 
What Bodin had previously discarded as a physical impossibility (i.e., pure contemplation in 
man’s earthly state) is now accepted as an exceptional but not impossible occurrence: man can 
experience pure contemplation even in his earthly life, just not as a permanent condition but as 
a moment of blissful, temporary detachment from his physical body – a sort of anticipation of 
death, or, rather, of life after death.27 In support of this idea Bodin cites a number of ancient 
                                                
23 «id quod Aristotelem valde conturbavit, nec seipsum ex ea difficultate explicare potuit»; Methodus, III.16, p. 
128. Bodin himself will give a different solution to this problem in the République, where he argues that the 
highest good for both states and individuals is contemplation, even though the material necessities of life on earth 
often leave very little space for it; hence, he notes, the importance of respecting a weekly day of rest from active 
life: «la fin principale de [la Republique bien ordonnée] gist aux vertus contemplatives, iaçoit que les actions 
politiques soyent preallables, et les moins illustres soyent les premieres: comme faire provisions necessaires, pour 
entretenir et defendre la vie des subiects: et neantmoins telles actions se rapportent aux morales, et celles cy aux 
intellectuelles, la fin desquelles est la contemplation du plus beau subiect qui soit, et qu’on puisse imaginer. Aussi 
voyons nous, que Dieu a laissé six iours pour toutes actions, estant la vie de l’homme subiecte pour la plus-part à 
icelles: mais il a ordonné, que le septieme, qu’il avoit beni sus tous les autres, seroit chommé, comme le sainct 
iour du repos, à fin de l’employer en la contemplation de ses oeuvres, de sa loy, et de ses louanges» (Les Six livres 
de la République (Paris: Jacques Dupuys, 1579), I.1, p. 7).   
24 «bonum hominis vitam agentis, neque otio, neque negotio; sed misto genere definiendum nobis erit, si volumus 
idem esse unius hominis, ac totius civitatis bonum» (Methodus, III.16, p. 128). Varro’s solution is reported in 
Augustine, De civitate Dei, XIX.3. 
25 «neque enim mens pura illa contemplatione prius frui potest, quam a corpore penitus avulsa fuerit» (Methodus, 
III.16, p. 130). Compare with Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, X.9, 1178b33-35. 
26 «Par ainsi Marc Varron, qui a mis la felicité en action et contemplation, eust mieux dit, à mon advis, que la vie 
de l’homme a besoin d’action et de contemplation: mais que le souverain bien gist en contemplation, que les 
Academiques ont appellé la mort plaisante et les Hebrieux la mort precieuse, d’autant qu’elle ravist l’ame hors de 
la fange corporelle, pour la deïfier» (République, I.1, p. 6).  
27 Bodin does point out that this condition of detachment from the body cannot last long in man’s earthly state: 
prolonged contemplation would certainly mean actual and not just metaphorical death («l’homme ne peut vivre 
longuement, si l’ame est si fort ravie en contemplation, qu’on en perde le boire et le manger», République, I.1, p. 
6). 
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and modern authorities, ranging with characteristic eclecticism from Plato (the Phaedo) and 
the Neoplatonists (particularly Ficino) to «the Jews» – Leone Ebreo, but also Moses 
Maimonides.28 What Bodin found (or thought he had found) in these authors was the possibility 
of a different type of contemplation from the one he had seen described in Aristotle. Isnardi 
Parente rightly notes that Bodin’s contemplation is not «an intellectual exercise» of the kind 
discussed in Nicomachean Ethics X; it is much closer to a religious experience – a 
«contemplative mysticism», in her own words.29 While Aristotle sees the contemplative life as 
the life of the gods – an ideal to which man can strive but without ever fully attaining it30 – 
Bodin sees it as a life that draws us closer to God and allows us to become one with Him.  
 But there is also another major way in which Bodin’s contemplation differs from 
Aristotle’s theoria. The latter, as we have seen, is said to consist in an activity of the mind (ἡ 
τοῦ νοῦ ἐνέργεια) or of the soul (ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια).31 But this is precisely the point that Bodin 
finds problematic: how can contemplation be a form of activity? Is this not in contradiction to 
Aristotle’s own principle (stated in Nicomachean Ethics VI and in other places) that whatever 
is perfect is sought for its own sake and not for the sake of something else? If contemplation is 
the highest form of life and man’s greatest good, then surely it must be perfect in itself. 
However, Aristotle himself states that activity is movement and movement always tends to 
something outside itself – a state of rest towards which it strives. If contemplation is a form of 
activity, albeit of an intellectual rather than a physical kind, this means that it consists in a 
movement towards something outside itself (e.g., the attainment of knowledge). If this is the 
case, then clearly contemplation itself is not man’s highest good but merely a stage towards it.  
 Bodin’s reasoning is not fleshed out so fully in the République, even less so in the 
Methodus, and in both works his attempt at unravelling Aristotle’s contradictions remains 
marred with contradictions of its own. It was not until some fifteen years later that these 
thoughts would receive a more coherent treatment in the Paradoxon – a work centrally 
concerned with the question of the greatest good, as discussed at the beginning of this section.32 
Bodin’s starting point in this work is the idea of a hierarchy of goods and stages towards 
happiness, which he probably derived from Aristotle (but he would also have found it discussed 
at length in Cicero and Augustine, two of his favourite authors),33 and which he had first 
introduced in the République to explain the “architectonic” relationship between action and 
contemplation. Action was presented there not as equal and complementary to contemplation, 
as was the case in the Methodus, but rather as a necessary first step towards it: thus without 
denying that human life requires both action and contemplation, Bodin was able to present one 
(contemplation) as a goal in itself and the other (action) as simply a means to an end.34 We 
have seen however that by this time Bodin had already begun to question whether 
contemplation can indeed be understood as the highest good (and thus as a goal in itself). Surely 
the contemplation that could be understood in these terms was not the one described by 
Aristotle, that «activity of the soul» that led one into insoluble contradiction. The simple yet 
clever solution that Bodin advanced in the Paradoxon consisted in positing a further stage 
beyond theoria (intellectual contemplation) that constituted the ultimate goal of both action 
and contemplation and the authentic highest good of mankind. That further stage Bodin defined 
as «the full enjoyment of the most excellent and most beautiful thing of all [i.e., God], which 
                                                
28 Isnardi Parente, “A proposito di un’interpretazione”, 441-447. 
29 Isnardi Parente, “A proposito di un’interpretazione”, 446. 
30 Nicomachean Ethics, X.8, 1178b21-23. 
31 Nicomachean Ethics, X.7, 1177b19; I.6, 1098a16-17. 
32 See Bodin, Paradoxon, pp. 62-64. 
33 On this particular aspect of Cicero’s and Augustine’s ethics, see Elena Cavalcanti, “La revisione dell’etica 
classica nel De civitate Dei”, in Il De civitate Dei. L’opera, le interpretazioni, l’influsso, ed. Elena Cavalcanti, 
(Rome-Freiburg-Wien: Herder, 1996), pp. 293-323. 
34 Bodin, République, I.1, p. 7. 
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consists in reflection» (rei omnium praestantissimae ac pulcherrimae plena fruiti[o], quae in 
actu reflexo versatur).35  
 In the Paradoxon, these words are uttered by the father (Bodin’s spokesperson 
throughout the dialogue) and prompt a series of follow-up questions from the son that shed 
further light on the meaning of Bodin’s actus reflexus. First the father makes a distinction 
between reflection and contemplation, stating that «the greatest happiness of all consists neither 
in action, as most people think, nor in contemplation, as many others also think, but in a 
reflection [actus reflexus] of God’s essence, that is, in a most bright effusion of His light onto 
us».36 Bodin could not have put it more clearly: contemplation (commonly conceived) and 
reflection are two different things. It is not just a matter of vocabulary: while he does blame 
Aristotle for covering the terms “action” and “contemplation” in ambiguity and contradiction 
by using “contemplation” to designate an activity of the mind,37 Bodin clearly intends his 
“reflection” to do more than simply replace the word contemplation in the old debate; he is 
hoping to redefine the debate itself, by introducing a tertium quid that is neither action nor 
contemplation and that can shift the discussion onto new grounds.  
 His intentions become clearer in the ensuing discussion, where the father brings out 
some crucial implications of this concept of reflection: it highlights man’s dependence on God 
(as opposed to Greco-Roman contemplation, which emphasized the virtuous man’s autarcheia 
or self-sufficiency);38 it preserves an ontological distinction between the infinite Creator and 
the finite creature by presenting their relationship in terms of similarity and proximity rather 
than of identity and union (a notion that Bodin attributes to the Neoplatonists and discards as 
absurd);39 and it draws attention to the passive nature of man’s enjoyment of God, which 
happens not by human effort but by God’s free effusion of His divine light.40 While each of 
these points is extremely important and would deserve extensive treatment, it is this last point 
in particular that matters most for understanding Bodin’s concept of reflection as opposed to 
the Aristotelian notion of theoria or contemplation. 
 Contemplation, for Aristotle, is the highest possible activity that the highest part of the 
human soul (i.e. the intellect) can perform: as such, it represents at once the apex of human 
fulfillment and man’s most distinctive function – the one that sets him apart from all other 
beings. Bodin agrees with Aristotle that man’s capacity for intellectual contemplation is 
distinctive and unique. He also agrees that contemplation is the farthest and highest that man 
can go on his own. But unlike Aristotle he does not believe that contemplation represents the 
apex of human fulfillment, because that apex lies in the enjoyment of God and God, by His 
radical alterity, infinity, and transcendence, cannot be an object of intellectual contemplation. 
This is why man’s encounter with God must happen by God’s initiative, not man’s: such is the 
gulf between creature and Creator that an active effort on man’s part could never successfully 
bridge it. In order to encounter God, man must, in a sense, turn off exactly that part of himself 
that enables him to contemplate, i.e. the active intellect, and let himself be inhabited by a higher 
                                                
35 Bodin, Paradoxon, p. 32. The French version reads: «la pleine et parfaite ioüissance de la plus belle et plus 
excellente chose de toutes, qui est la fruition de Dieu qui ne se peut avoir que par reflexion» (Paradoxe, in Bodin, 
Paradosso della virtù, p. 140). 
36 «Ut intelligamus foelicitatem omnium maximam nec in actione consistere, ut plerique, nec in contemplatione, 
ut plures etiam arbitrantur: sed in actu reflexo divinae essentiae, id est, in clarissima lucis erga nos effusione» 
(Bodin, Paradoxon, p. 34).   
37 See Bodin, Paradoxon, pp. 40 and 62. 
38 Bodin, Paradoxon, p. 32. 
39 Ibid. («sapientiae magister Deum proximum fieri scripsit iis qui illum ardenter amant, non tamen uniri dixit»; 
«Deo quidem adhaerere et cohaerere creaturae licet, non tamen uniri»). 
40 Bodin, Paradoxon, p. 44. Rose explains in what ways Bodin’s concepts of “effusion” and “illumination” differ 
from the Christian concept of grace (Jean Bodin and the Great God of Nature, pp. 102-110); he makes many 
important points, although he might be generally overstating his case. 
 9 
intellect (the agent intellect, or intellectus actuosus) that fills him with its light. In other words, 
man’s encounter with God is not an action but a being-acted-upon: a state of passive 
receptivity.  
 
Such enjoyment [of God] is passive, not active, therefore it is the exact opposite of the contemplation of 
things that are inferior to the human spirit: in this case the spirit acts, as it were, in contemplating them; 
but when it ascends above itself to the agent intellect (that is the Angel) or to God who clears away the 
darkness of our soul by His divine light, then it lets God act in it: just as the eye acts when it gazes on 
the earth, but it is acted upon when it turns towards the sun.41  
 
This passage establishes a series of important dichotomies between reflection and 
contemplation. Contemplation is active, reflection is passive; contemplation looks down onto 
lower realities, reflection looks up towards God; contemplation is a seeing (the literal meaning 
of the Greek word theoria), reflection is a being blinded by a dazzling light. The introduction 
of the eye analogy (which reminds us of Plato’s allegory of the cave) is especially valuable 
because it enables Bodin to stress the non-intellectual nature of man’s encounter with God. He 
has already pointed out that the human intellect is unable to reach God through a natural ascent 
from lower to higher realities, on account of the immense ontological gap that separates the 
creature from its Creator. He now stresses that even when God personally reaches out to man 
and sheds His light on him, the human intellect (mens) is unable to sustain this divine light, 
just as the eye is blinded by the sun’s overwhelming brightness. Thus, when the son suggests 
that the greatest good of man might lie in the «right knowledge of God», his father corrects 
him: complete happiness comes not from knowing but from loving and enjoying God; it has to 
do with desire and will much more than with intellect and cognition. We shall return to this 
important remark in the next section, where its philosophical background will be explained 
more fully.42 For the moment, I hope to have clarified what compelled Bodin to introduce this 
new notion of reflection into the traditional debate on action and contemplation; what exactly 
he meant by it, and how he felt that this notion would modify and advance the debate; and what 
implications it had for his understanding of the God-man relationship (but also, vice versa, how 
his understanding of this relationship shaped his definition of reflection). It is now time to turn 
to an investigation of Bodin’s possible sources, which will allow us not only to assess the 
relative originality of his theory of reflection, but also to uncover some lesser-known influences 
operating on his thought.  
 
3. SCHOLASTIC AND MYSTICAL ORIGINS OF BODIN’S THEORY OF 
REFLECTION 
 
In the previous section we have seen that Bodin conceived of happiness not as «activity 
according to virtue», as did Aristotle, but as a passive state in which the soul receives and 
reflects God’s light. As the father puts it to his son in the Paradoxon: «Man’s supreme 
happiness lies in reflection [actus reflexus], because we are made happy not by acting [agendo], 
                                                
41 My translation is based on the French version, which is slightly more eloquent («telle iouissance est passive, et 
non pas active, qui est du tout contraire à la contemplation des choses inferieurs à l’esprit humain, qui agit 
aucunement en les contemplant: mais quand il s’esleve par dessus soy mesme à l’intellect actuel, qui est l’Ange, 
ou à Dieu qui eclaircit de sa lumiere divine les tenebres de nos ames, alors il souffre que Dieu agisse en luy: tout 
ainsi que l’oeil agit quand il considere la terre: mais il souffre quand il se tourne vers le soleil»; Paradoxe, p. 143); 
but the passage is very similar in the Latin version («illam quam quaerimus, aut certe quaerere debemus, 
beatitatem […] patiendo adipiscimur: Mens enim cum inferiora contemplatur agit: cum vero ad superiora, scilicet 
ad intellectum actuosum et illustrantem humanae mentis caliginem, vel ad Deum ipsum fertur, tunc pati dicitur: 
non aliter quam oculus qui tunc agit cum terrestria et obscura intuetur: cum vero convertitur ad solem aut ad 
lucem, seipso splendidiorem dicitur pati»; Paradoxon, p. 40). 
42 On this point see also Couzinet, Sub specie hominis, pp. 111-112. 
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but by being acted upon [patendo]».43 This section explores the question of Bodin’s possible 
sources for this idea. We shall see that while he appears to have drawn the phrase actus reflexus 
from late scholastic debates, he gave it a new meaning by re-interpreting it in the light of other 
philosophical and theological traditions, including the mystical theology of Meister Eckhart 
and Nicholas of Cusa (or Cusanus).  
 
 The scholastic debate  
 
The phrase actus reflexus is of late scholastic coinage: to the best of my knowledge, its earliest 
documented use is in Duns Scotus’s Ordinatio, a collection of lectures on Peter Lombard’s 
Sentences that Scotus delivered partly at Oxford and partly at Paris between 1298 and 1303 
and that were published in much revised form by Scotus’s pupils after his death.44 Here we 
find the notion of actus reflexus used in two different contexts. Scotus first introduces it in 
Ordinatio I to distinguish between love of God (defined as an actus rectus) and love of one’s 
neighbour (defined as an actus reflexus). As Antonie Vos explains, «the actus rectus of love is 
immediately related to God» whereas «loving my neighbor is an actus reflexus which mediates 
the act of loving God: I will that my neighbor also loves God as he is in himself so that I love 
him too.»45 While an actus reflexus in this sense is «an act of the will which becomes the object 
of another act of will (a second-order act of will)»,46 elsewhere in his Ordinatio Scotus expands 
the semantic capacity of this term to include intellectual acts as well. In this other sense, the 
distinction between actus rectus and actus reflexus can be invoked to explain the difference 
between simple cognitive acts (x knows y) and self-reflexive cognitive acts (x knows that s/he 
knows y) – in other words, between knowledge and self-knowledge.  
 It was in this latter sense that the distinction rose to importance in the early decades of 
the fourteenth century. At this time, a heated discussion about the nature of happiness took 
place in Paris as an outgrowth of an earlier and much larger debate known as the “controversy 
of the Correctoria”. This controversy began shortly after Thomas Aquinas’s death in 1274 and 
raged throughout the last quarter of the century, opposing Thomas’s supporters (for the most 
part Dominicans) to his critics (mainly Franciscans).47 While the debate extended to many 
topics – including the eternity of the world and the relationship between reason and faith – one 
of the central issues was the nature of happiness: broadly speaking, while the Dominicans 
maintained that happiness consists in the intellectual vision of God (also known as the visio 
beatifica), the Franciscans argued that it consists in love of God leading to a complete 
transformation of the human subject.48 The dispute revolved in part around a different 
interpretation of Augustine’s doctrine of illumination, which formed the basis of Thomas’s 
theory of knowledge: according to this doctrine, human knowledge is possible thanks to the 
human intellect’s participation in the eternal light of God’s intellect.49 But when it came to 
                                                
43 «beatitatem hominis maximam in actu reflexo versari diximus, quia patiendo non agendo beamur» (Paradoxon, 
p. 43). Note that this passage has no direct parallel in the French version.  
44 For the complex history of this text, see Antonie Vos et al., “Introduction”, in Duns Scotus on Divine Love: 
Texts and Commentary on Goodness and Freedom, God and Humans, ed. Antonie Vos et al. (London and New 
York: Routledge, 2017), pp. 3-5. 
45 Antonie Vos, The Theology of John Duns Scotus (Leiden: Brill, 2018), p. 299.   
46 Vos et al., “Introduction”, p. 71. 
47 For an overview of this controversy, see Mark D. Jordan, “The Controversy of the Correctoria and the Limits 
of Metaphysics”, Speculum, 57/2 (1982): 292-314.  
48 Thomas Jetschke, Deus ut tentus vel visus: Die Debatte um die Seligkeit im reflexiven Akt (ca. 1293–1320) 
(Leiden: Brill, 2010), pp. 15-16.  
49 The exact meaning and implications of this doctrine are still widely debated among scholars of Thomas: see 
Wayne John Hankey, “Participatio divini luminis, la doctrine de Thomas d’Aquin sur l’intellect agent: notre 
capacité à la contemplation”, in Vers la contemplation. Etudes sur la syndérèse et les modalités de la 
contemplation de l’Antiquité à la Renaissance, ed. Christian Trottmann (Paris: Champion, 2007), pp. 121-155. 
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human knowledge of God, it was unclear how participation in the divine intellect worked. Was 
the vision of God also an act of the intellect or was it a unitive, mystical experience made 
possible by love? The Dominicans favoured the former position, while the Franciscans leaned 
towards the latter, thus reenacting a tension that according to some scholars was inherent in 
Augustine’s own thought.50  
 Towards the end of the thirteenth century, the Dominican theologian Jean Quidort, also 
known as John of Paris, set out to settle the quarrel by proposing what he saw as a compromise 
solution. What he suggested was in fact quite new: he maintained that the «direct vision of 
God» (visio nuda divinae essentiae) was not the highest possible degree of happiness but rather 
a precondition for it; true happiness instead consisted in the pleasure (fruitio, delectatio) that 
comes with possessing God (tentio spiritualis) and, more importantly, with perceiving and 
seeing oneself possess Him (perceptio et visio huius tentionis).51 Though widely contested,52 
Quidort’s position was later adopted and modified by another Dominican, Durandus of Saint-
Pourçain, and it was in this revised form that his ideas reached a later generation of thinkers.53 
Building on Quidort, but taking his language from Duns Scotus, Durandus argued that the 
perfection of human happiness lay not in the «direct act» (actus rectus) of knowing God, but 
in one’s awareness of that act, that is, in the «reflexive act» (actus reflexus) of knowing that 
we know Him.54 Durandus’s theory was influential, but extremely controversial.55 In Paris, it 
gave birth to a lively debate that in the 1310s and 1320s involved some of the most prominent 
scholastic thinkers of the day, such as Prosper of Reggio Emilia, John of Pouilly, Guy Terrena 
(Guido Terreni), and Peter of Palude. Their key arguments were summarized around 1325 by 
the Carmelitan theologian John Baconthorpe, who carefully considered both positions and 
ultimately took a firm stance against Durandus’s theory of actus reflexus.56  
 It was through Baconthorpe, I suggest, that Bodin came into contact with the theory of 
happiness as actus reflexus. While the language of actus reflexus is already present in Duns 
Scotus, of whose works Bodin was a keen reader,57 it is only in the early fourteenth-century 
controversy surrounding Durandus that the phrase is used with specific reference to the 
                                                
They were also subject to debate during the controversy of the Correctoria. Jean Devriendt has stressed that both 
the Franciscans and the Dominicans were consciously operating within the Augustinian tradition of illumination, 
and that there is no evidence for assuming (as is often the case) any rigid dichotomy between 
Franciscans/Augustinians on the one hand and Dominicans/Aristotelians on the other hand (“Les questions posées 
par le lexique latin utilisé par Eckhart dans les thématiques du sujet, de l’intellect et de l’image”, in Intellect, sujet, 
image chez Eckhart et Nicolas de Cues, ed. Marie-Anne Vannier (Paris: Cerf, 2014), p. 60).   
50 See Robert E. Lauder, “Augustine: Illumination, Mysticism and Person”, in Augustine: Mystic and Mystagogue. 
Collectanea Augustiniana, ed. Frederick Van Fleteren, Joseph C. Schnaubelt and Joseph Reino (New York: Peter 
Lang, 1994), pp. 177-205. 
51 J.-P. Mueller, “Les critiques de la thèse de Jean Quidort sur la béatitude formelle”, Recherches de théologie 
ancienne et médiévale, 15 (1948): 152-170. 
52 Mueller, “Les critiques de la thèse de Jean Quidort”, 153. 
53 Jetschke, Deus ut tentus vel visus, p. 8. 
54 According to Russell L. Friedman, Durandus had a theological/ontological reason for arguing this: «Because 
God is distinct from us, he can’t be the immediate object of our enjoyment but only through the act by which we 
attain him. Thus, our act of attaining God is the immediate object of our enjoyment or fruitio; God is the remote 
object» (“On the Trail of a Philosophical Debate: Durandus of St.-Pourçain vs. Thomas Wylton on Simultaneous 
Acts of the Intellect”, in Philosophical Debates at Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century, ed. Stephen F. Brown, 
Thomas Dewender and Theo Kobusch (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2009), p. 444). 
55 Friedman, “On the Trail of a Philosophical Debate”, p. 445. 
56 Jetschke, Deus ut tentus vel visus, pp. 511-529. 
57 See Margherita Isnardi Parente, “Il volontarismo di Jean Bodin: Maimonide o Duns Scoto?”, Il pensiero politico 
4/1 (1971): 21-45. The Paradoxon contains a number of marginal references to Scotus’s commentary on Peter 
Lombard’s Sentences. Mogens Chrom Jacobsen helpfully reminds us that Scotism was very widespread in 
sixteenth-century Paris (Jean Bodin et le dilemme de la philosophie politique moderne (Copenhagen: Museum 
Tusculanum Press, 2000), p. 56). 
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question of happiness, which forms the context for Bodin’s use of it in the Paradoxon. It may 
also not be a coincidence that the authorities cited by Baconthorpe in his critique of Durandus 
all resurface in Bodin’s discussion of reflection in the Paradoxon: these include Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics, various works of Augustine, and scriptural references (to John’s Gospel, 
Paul’s first letter to the Corinthians, and the Psalms). Finally, it is certain that Bodin read 
Baconthorpe during the two years that he spent with the Carmelites in Paris: Baconthorpe’s 
writings formed the backbone of the sixteenth-century Carmelite curriculum in theology and 
philosophy,58 and a number of studies have convincingly shown that Bodin’s scholastic 
education in Paris left a deeper mark on him than is sometimes assumed.59 In fact, if we accept 
that he did draw his language of happiness as actus reflexus from Baconthorpe (as seems highly 
likely), these passages from the Paradoxon may be the strongest evidence to date that he 
retained a trace of his Carmelite upbringing into his late life. 
 Two points, however, must be noted. First, Baconthorpe expounds the doctrine of 
happiness as actus reflexus not in order to endorse it but in order to reject it. His conclusions 
are firmly in favour of Thomas’s view of happiness as a direct intellectual vision of God (per 
actum intellectus, qui est visio essentie divine),60 as opposed to a self-reflexive knowledge of 
this vision. Bodin, on the other hand, states that the greatest happiness of man lies «in a 
reflection of God’s essence» (in actu reflexo divinae essentiae). Thus, even assuming that he 
did get his language of actus reflexus from Baconthorpe, he clearly was not drawing the same 
conclusions as the doctor resolutus. More importantly, Bodin seems to be giving the phrase 
actus reflexus a completely different meaning from the one documented in Baconthorpe. For 
Baconthorpe, as for the other scholastic theologians who participated in the Durandus debate, 
actus reflexus designates a particular type of cognitive act – one by which the intellect turns 
back to itself to become aware of its own acts. Bodin’s actus reflexus, instead, has nothing to 
do with a self-reflexive cognitive act; in fact, as we shall see shortly, it has very little to do with 
a cognitive act at all. Properly speaking it is not even an act, since Bodin, as noted previously, 
is careful to remove any element of agency from the highest stage of man’s encounter with 
God. Bodin’s actus reflexus is best described as a condition of passive receptivity to God’s 
light, one in which the purified soul is so clean and polished that it is able to reflect God’s light 
nearly as brightly as it receives it, like a mirror; as the father tells his son,  
 
Ephemeral things, we may use and abuse; but as for eternal things, we enjoy them to the extent that is 
given to each of us according to our individual capacity, just like mirrors: the bigger and cleaner they are 
(as long as they are flat), the more accurately and brightly they reproduce the image of the things that 
stand before them, and yet they do not contain the things [that they reflect].61   
 
This very rich passage gives a sense of Bodin’s breadth of reading and eclectic use of sources. 
We note, first of all, the Augustinian distinction between uti and frui, which was central to 
Augustine’s understanding of how man relates differently to God and to creation (a point that 
                                                
58 On Bodin’s studies in Paris, see Jacobsen, Jean Bodin et le dilemme, pp. 55-58; on the Carmelite cursus 
studiorum, see Elisée de la Nativité, “La vie intellectuelle des Carmes”, Etudes carmélitaines, mystiques et 
missionnaires 20/1 (1935): 93-157. 
59 Jacobsen, for instance, argues that Bodin’s time with the Carmelites in Paris «does not seem to have left many 
traces on him» (Jean Bodin et le dilemme, p. 57). Both Rose (Bodin and the Great God of Nature) and Lloyd 
(Jean Bodin) have argued against this view. More generally on scholastic influences on Bodin’s thought, see 
Isnardi Parente, “Il volontarismo di Jean Bodin”. 
60 John Baconthorpe, In I Sent., D. 1, Q. 1, A. 1, § 21, cited in Jetschke, Deus ut tentus vel visus, p. 601.  
61 «Rebus quidem caducis uti licet atque abuti, aeternis vero frui quantum cuique pro suo capto tribuitur, ut specula 
quo maiora sunt ac nitidiora, modo plana fuerint, eo veriorem ac splendidiorem referunt speciem obiectarum 
rerum, non tamen a speculis continentur» (Bodin, Paradoxon, p. 32). The analogy between mirrors and human 
souls is even more explicit in the French version, which adds at the end of the passage: «ainsi est il des creatures 
intellectuelles qui recoyvent la fruition de Dieu selon leur grandeur et capacité» (Paradoxe, p. 140).  
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is central to Bodin’s distinction between contemplation and reflection, as discussed in the 
previous section).62 The passage also bears traces of scholastic principles: Bodin’s idea that the 
soul, like a mirror, receives and reflects God’s light according to its capacity is a rearticulation 
of the old Thomist adage that «Whatever is received is received in the manner of the receiver» 
(Quidquid recipitur, ad modum recipientis recipitur). At the same time, Bodin’s mirror analogy 
bears witness to his familiarity with another strand of literature that is not often identified as a 
major influence on him: the literature of late medieval and Renaissance mysticism. While this 
is obviously not the place for an exhaustive investigation of Bodin’s mystical sources (nor for 
a discussion of what «mysticism» might mean in this context), what I would like to suggest 
here is that his re-reading of the scholastic debates on actus reflexus through the analogical 
language of late medieval and Renaissance mysticism allowed him to develop a relatively 
original position that was indebted to, and yet different from, both the scholastic and the 
mystical traditions.  
 
 The mystical tradition  
 
 As discussed above, Bodin seems to have drawn his language of happiness as actus 
reflexus from Baconthorpe, but with one crucial difference: while Baconthorpe used the phrase 
actus reflexus in the literal, technical sense of “self-reflexive cognitive act”, Bodin used it in 
the non-literal, analogical sense of “state of passive receptivity in which the soul, like a mirror, 
reflects God’s light more or less brightly according to its greater or lesser purity”. Bodin’s 
actus reflexus is not self-reflective, is not cognitive, is not even an act (in spite of its somewhat 
confusing name). If we want to find where Bodin could have taken inspiration for his 
understanding of happiness as a non-cognitive, mirror-like state of passive reflection of God’s 
light, we need to turn to Cusanus’s De filiatione Dei (On Divine Sonship), a work composed in 
1445 and included in the Paris 1514 edition of his Opera omnia overseen by Jacques Lefèvre 
d’Etaples.  
 Cusanus’s main argument in this text is that the divine sonship described in John 1:12 
(«Yet to all who did receive Him, to those who believed in His name, He gave the right to 
become children of God [filios dei fieri]») should be interpreted as a form of theosis or 
deificatio (the “becoming godlike” of early Greek Christianity, which still occupied an 
important place in Augustine’s thought)63 and as an intuitive vision (visio intuitiva) of the One. 
Cusanus argues that this sonship-theosis-intuitive vision enables our intellect to break free from 
conceptual thinking and thus, «having been freed from these restrictive modes», to «obtain (by 
means of its intellectual light) the divine life as its happiness».64 He is careful to distinguish 
his Christian understanding of theosis from that of late ancient Neoplatonism and Hermeticism, 
which seemed to uphold the possibility of an actual fusion of the human soul with the One 
leading to an identity of substance between man and God. The theosis that Cusanus is 
describing does not entail «identity of nature» (identitas naturae), which is of course reserved 
to Jesus Christ, «the Only Begotten Son» (unigenitus). Christ’s sonship Cusanus calls 
                                                
62 Kimberly Georgedes, “Uti/Frui Distinction”, in The Oxford Guide to the Historical Reception of Augustine, ed. 
Karla Pollmann et al., vol. 3 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 1838-1843. 
63 David Vincent Meconi, “Augustine’s Doctrine of Deification”, in The Cambridge Companion to Augustine, 
2nd ed., ed. David Vincent Meconi and Eleonore Stump (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 
208-226.  
64 Nicholas of Cusa (Cusanus), On Being a Son of God (De filiatione Dei), in A Miscellany on Nicholas of Cusa, 
trans. Jasper Hopkins (Minneapolis: The Arthur J. Banning Press, 1994), I.54, p. 161. For the Latin original, see 
the anastatic reprint of the Lefèvre edition: Nicolai Cusae Cardinalis Opera. Parisiis 1514, vol. 1 (Frankfurt am 
Main: Unveränderter Nachdruck, 1962), fol. 65v: «sic scilicet ut foelicitatem suam intellectus noster ab his modis 
subtrahentibus liberatus sua intellectuali luce divinam vitam nanciscatur». 
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superabsoluta filiatio, or «superabsolute sonship», to avoid confusion with the «adoptive» 
sonship of ordinary human beings (adoptionis participatio).65  
 For those who object that even this adoptive sonship is impossible on account of God’s 
incomprehensibility to the human intellect, Cusanus has a twofold answer. He first admits that 
the human experience of God is never of His actual essence but of the way in which His essence 
is manifested to us;66 nevertheless, he reiterates that a face-to-face vision of God is possible 
and represents the summit of man’s happiness, as all striving and all desires find rest in it («that 
objective truth is that which quiets all intellectual motion»).67 But because God «transcends 
the intellect» and «is not found in the realm of the intellect», then the intellect cannot «attain 
unto Him beyond this heaven-of-being». The boundaries of human intellect coincide with 
creation; God, who transcends creation, «can be attained beyond the intellectual realm only 
negatively».68 This is Cusanus’s via negativa, which he derives to a large extent from Pseudo-
Dionysius and which is too well known to dwell on here.69 What matters is Cusanus’s point 
that God cannot be reached through ordinary intellectual activity, because His absolute 
transcendence makes His essence unknowable to our intellect. We have seen in section 2 that 
this was also Bodin’s opinion, and that the acknowledgment of a radical ontological gap 
between Creator and creatures was precisely what compelled him to distinguish between 
contemplation and reflection.  
 The similarities do not end here, because Cusanus then goes on to describe «the 
pathway of enjoying true being and life—viz., [the pathway] of the very lofty rapture of our 
[intellectual] spirit», which «is attained with peace and quietude when our spirit is filled with 
this manifestation of God’s glory».70 In this domain, Cusanus points out, one can only proceed 
by means of analogies and illustrations, because the experience of this «lofty rapture» lies 
beyond the realm of the speakable. Thus in order to describe the experience of God’s 
manifested glory, Cusanus chooses to compare the human intellect to a mirror. The passage is 
long but worth quoting (almost) in full: 
 
[Visible] forms that are equal in straight mirrors appear to be less than equal in curved mirrors. Therefore, 
suppose that there is a most lofty Reflection of our Beginning, viz., the glorious God—a Reflection in 
which God Himself appears. Let this Reflection be a Mirror-of-truth that is without blemish, completely 
straight, most perfect, and without bounds.71 And let all creatures be mirrors with different degrees of 
contraction and differently curved. Among these creatures let the intellectual natures be living mirrors 
that are straighter and more clearly reflecting [than the others]. And since [these intellectual mirrors] are 
                                                
65 Cusanus, On Being a Son of God, I.54, p. 161. Compare Opera, vol. 1, fol. 65r. 
66 «truth as it exists in something other [than itself] can be comprehended as existing only in some way other [than 
the way it exists in itself]» (Cusanus, On Being a Son of God, III.62, p. 165). Compare Opera, vol. 1, fol. 66r: 
«Arbitror te satis intellexisse veritatem: in alio non nisi aliter posse compraehendi». 
67 Cusanus, On Being a Son of God, I. 63, p. 165. Compare Opera, vol. 1, fol. 66r: «quietatio omnis intellectualis 
motus est veritas obiectalis». 
68 Cusanus, On Being a Son of God, I.64, p. 166. Compare Opera, vol. 1, fol. 66r: «Unde cum [deus] omnem 
intellectum sic exuperet: non reperitus sic in regione seu coelo intellectus nec potest per intellectum attingi extra 
ipsum coelum esse. Hinc deus cum non possit nisi negative extra intellectualem regionem attingi: tunc via 
fruitionis in veritate esse et vivere in coelo ipso empyreo scilicet altissimi raptus nostri spiritus attingitur cum pace 
et quiete quando satiatur spiritus in hac apparitione gloriae dei». 
69 See, for instance: H. Lawrence Bond, “Mystical Theology”, in Introducing Nicholas of Cusa: A Guide to a 
Renaissance Man, ed. Christopher M. Bellitto, Thomas M. Izbicki and Gerald Christianson (New York and 
Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 2004), pp. 205-231; William J. Hoye, “Die Grenze des Wissens. Nikolaus von Kues 
in Auseinandersetzung mit der mystischen Theologie des Dionysius Areopagita”, in Nikolaus von Kues in der 
Geschichte des Platonismus, ed. Klaus Reinhardt and Harald Schwaetzer (Regensburg: Roderer, 2007), pp. 87-
102; Edward Cranz, “Nicolaus Cusanus and Dionysius Areopagita”, in Nicholas of Cusa and the Renaissance, 
ed. Thomas M. Izbicki and Gerald Christianson (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), pp. 109-136. 
70 Cusanus, On Being a Son of God, I.64, p. 166. Compare Opera, vol. 1, fol. 66r (quoted in n. 68 above). 
71 This «mirror-of-truth», as Cusanus explains further below (On Being a Son of God, III.67, p. 167), is Christ, 
through whom every intellectual mirror (i.e., every human soul) obtains adoptive sonship.  
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alive and intellectual and free, conceive them to be of such kind that they can curve themselves, straighten 
themselves, and clean themselves. I say, then: One [and the same] reflected-brightness appears variously 
in all mirror-reflections. But in the first, most straight Reflected-brightness all the other mirrors appear 
as they are. […]  But in each of the other mirrors, which are contracted and curved, all the other mirrors 
appear not as they themselves are but in accordance with the condition of the receiving mirror, i.e., with 
some diminishment because of the receiving mirror’s deviation from straightness. […] that [intellectual,] 
living mirror (as it were, a living eye)—upon receiving the first Mirror’s reflected light—in [one and] 
the same moment of eternity beholds (in that same Mirror-of-truth) itself as it is and beholds (within 
itself) all the mirrors in its own [conditioning] manner. For the more simple and less contracted and more 
bright, clean, straight, just, and true [the intellectual mirror] is, the more clearly, joyously, and truly it 
will behold within itself God’s glory and all mirrors.72  
 
The undeniable similarity between this passage and Bodin’s mirror analogy in the Paradoxon 
is even more striking in light of the relative rarity of comparable examples: while the imagery 
of mirrors and specularity is of course extensive in Western literature and philosophy,73 I have 
not encountered many cases in which the ordinary human soul (or intellect) is presented as a 
mirror reflecting God’s light with varying degrees of brightness.74 The context in which the 
image occurs is also remarkably similar in Bodin and Cusanus: in both cases it appears within 
a larger discussion of questions of deificatio and visio beatifica; in both cases it is introduced 
to explain how an experience of God is possible for the creature despite God’s radical alterity 
and transcendence; in both cases it serves the purpose of preserving an ontological distinction 
between God and man (as Bodin points out, the mirror reflects the object but does not contain 
it), thus avoiding the danger of presenting the mystical union between the two as an actual 
merging of substances. Cusanus’s influence on Bodin has never been systematically studied, 
but we do know that Bodin read and appreciated the cardinal’s works; the Paradoxon itself 
contains a marginal reference to De docta ignorantia, another text included in the first volume 
of the Lefèvre 1514 edition of Cusanus’s Opera omnia which also contains De filiatione Dei; 
and it has been suggested that Bodin’s great dialogue on religious tolerance, the Colloquium 
                                                
72 Cusanus, On Being a Son of God, III.65-67, pp. 166-167. Compare Opera, vol. 1, fol. 66v: «formas aequales in 
rectis speculis minores in curvis apparere. Sit igitur altissima resplendentia principii nostri dei gloriosi in qua 
appareat deus ipse: quae sit veritatis speculum sine macula rectissimum atque interminum perfectissimumque. 
Sintque omnes creaturae specula contractiora et differenter curva: inter quae intellectuales naturae sint viva 
clariora atque rectiora specula. Ac talia cum sint viva et intellectualia atque libera: concipito quod possint seipsa 
incurvare, rectificare et mundare. Dico igitur. Claritas una specularis varie in istis universis resplendet 
specularibus reflexionibus et in prima rectissima speculari claritate omnia specula uti sunt resplendent […]. In 
omnibus autem aliis contractis et curvis omnia non uti ipsa sunt apparent: sed secundum recipientis speculi 
conditionem. Scilicet cum diminutione: ob recessum recipientis speculi a rectitudine. […] vivum illud speculum 
quasi oculus vivus cum receptione luminis resplendentiae primi speculi in eodem veritatis speculo se uti est 
intuetur: et in se omnia suo quidem modo. Quanto enim simplicius absolutius clarius mundius rectius iustius et 
verius fuerit: tanto in se gloriam dei atque omnia limpidius iocundius veriusque intuebitur». 
73 Andrea Tagliapietra, La metafora dello specchio. Lineamenti per una storia simbolica (Turin: Bollati 
Boringhieri, 2008). 
74 Maurice Scève’s Délie 229 would be a comparable example, as long as we accept Michael J. Giordano’s 
religious interpretation of Scève’s love poetry (The Art of Meditation and the French Renaissance Love Lyric: 
The Poetics of Introspection in Maurice Scève’s Délie, object de plus haulte vertu (1544) (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2012), p. 312). The image of the human soul as a mirror of God is also present in Guillaume du 
Vair’s Saincte philosophie (composed c. 1585 and first printed in 1588, thus chronologically very close to the 
Paradoxon), but in this case it refers not to any human soul but specifically to Adam’s soul before the Fall: it thus 
points to the prelapsarian likeness of man to God, in contrast with his postlapsarian state of sin and corruption. 
Outside of France, the image is attested in Sperone Speroni’s Dialogo della vita attiva e contemplativa, which 
however could not have been known to Bodin: probably composed in the 1530s, it was not published until 1596 
and was thus excluded from Claude Gruget’s 1551 translation of Speroni’s dialogues into French. In Speroni as 
in Du Vair, the mirror analogy refers specifically to Adam’s likeness to God before the Fall. I am grateful to 
Alessio Cotugno and David Lines for bringing Speroni’s case to my attention.  
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Heptaplomeres, may have been inspired by Cusanus’s De pace fidei.75 In sum, there is strong 
evidence that Cusanus may indeed have been Bodin’s primary source for his mirror analogy in 
the Paradoxon.  
 Further digging would likely uncover an even deeper network of relationships between 
Bodin and Cusanus’s own sources: not only Plotinus and Pseudo-Dionysius, whose presence 
(whether positive or polemical) in Bodin is known to be pervasive;76 but also Augustine, whose 
ill-defined mysticism has been at the centre of much recent scholarly debate,77 and whose 
influence on Bodin still warrants further study; and, finally, the late medieval mystical tradition 
best embodied by Meister Eckhart, an author who deeply shaped Cusanus’s theology and who 
also had an important afterlife in early modern France.78 Passive receptivity was a central tenet 
of Eckhart’s mysticism (as of mysticism in general), and his idea that «our blessedness does 
not lie in our active doing, rather in our passive reception of God» clearly resonates with 
Bodin’s own position in the Paradoxon.79 Furthermore, the mystical notion of a triplex via that 
leads to union with God through purification and illumination is central for understanding 
Bodin’s idea that, while reflection is a free effusion of God’s light and thus happens strictly by 
God’s initiative, man can prepare for it by cleansing his spirit and turning his purified soul 
towards God in loving prayer.80 
 But this is food for further thought. What I hope to have shown in this article is, first, 
that Bodin introduced his theory of reflection as a corrective to Aristotle’s idea of happiness as 
contemplation (that is, as «activity of the soul») and thus as a solution to a number of 
conceptual contradictions from which Bodin himself had not been able to extricate himself 
fully in previous works; second, that this theory has a double origin, scholastic on the one hand, 
mystical on the other. While Bodin’s language of actus reflexus comes straight from late 
scholastic debates about happiness and the vision of God, and particularly from his early 
reading of the Carmelite theologian John Baconthorpe, he then subjected this language to a 
complete semantic overhaul, reinterpreting it in light of Cusanus’s mirror analogy so as to 
emphasize the mystical notion of happiness as passive receptivity to God’s light as opposed to 
the (fundamentally Aristotelian) idea of happiness as something that consisted in, or could be 
                                                
75 See Cesare Vasoli, “De Nicolas de Kues et Jean Pic de la Mirandole à Jean Bodin: trois colloques”, in Jean 
Bodin. Actes du colloque interdisciplinare d’Angers, 24-27 mai 1984, vol. 1, ed. Georges Cesbron (Angers: 
Presses universitaires d’Angers, 1985), pp. 253-275. Hartmut Bobzin has also identified a quotation from 
Cusanus’s Cribratio Alcorani in Bodin’s Colloquium Heptaplomeres: “Islamkundliche Quellen in Jean Bodins 
Heptaplomeres”, in Jean Bodins Colloquium Heptaplomeres, ed. Günther Gawlick and Friedrich Niewöhner 
(Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 1996), pp. 41-57. 
76 See Lloyd, Jean Bodin, passim (but esp. p. 260) for numerous examples. Pierre Mesnard, Cesare Vasoli, and 
Elisabetta Scapparone, among others, have studied the presence of Neoplatonic influences in Bodin.  
77 See the essays collected in Augustine: Mystic and Mystagogue, and particularly the very helpful review essay 
by Gerald Bonner, “Augustin and Mysticism”, pp. 113-157. 
78 Jean-Marie Gueullette, Eckhart en France: La lecture des Institutions Spirituelles attribuées à Tauler, 1548-
1699, Grenoble: Jérôme Millon, 2012. Eckhart’s influence on Cusanus has been widely studied (for a recent 
overview, see Elizabeth Brient, “Meister Eckhart’s Influence on Nicholas of Cusa: A Survey of the Literature”, 
in A Companion to Meister Eckhart, ed. Jeremiah M. Hackett (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2013), pp. 553-585). It 
is also worth recalling that Léfèvre d’Etaples, in addition to editing the works of Cusanus and Pseudo-Dionysius 
(as well as various works of Aristotle and the Hermetica), was also responsible for the first printed edition (Paris 
1513) of the mystical works of Hildegard of Bingen and other medieval German female mystics. On this, and on 
early modern French mysticism in general, see Yelena Masur-Matusevich, Le siècle d’or de la mystique française. 
De Jean Gerson à Jacques Léfèvre d’Etaples (Milan: Archè, 2004). 
79 German sermon 24, “Ubi est qui natus est rex Judaeorum? (Matt. 2:2)”, in Meister Eckhart, Selected Writings, 
trans. Oliver Davies (London: Penguin Classics, 1994), p. 215.   
80 On this point, see especially Rose, Bodin and the Great God of Nature; Rose however ties Bodin’s idea of 
spiritual preparation too narrowly to the “Judaizing” tradition of Philo of Alexandria, while I argue that a number 
of other traditions (including various forms of Christian mysticism) may have weighed equally if not more 
strongly on him. For the triplex via, see Giordano, The Art of Meditation. 
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reached through, intellectual activity. Bodin’s discussion of reflection thus represents a typical 
example of his eclectic handling of sources, but it also reveals his (thus far largely unsuspected) 
debts to specific authors (Baconthorpe, Cusanus) or intellectual traditions (Christian 
mysticism). Finally, and more importantly, studying the genesis of Bodin’s theory of reflection 
has allowed us to see how he went about confronting a challenging philosophical problem that 
in his opinion had not yet found a satisfactory solution. Bodin explored a range of existing 
answers, put each of them to the test, settled for temporary solutions when pressed to publish, 
but never failed to reopen the dossier in subsequent works, making his way through conceptual 
inconsistencies and lexical inaccuracies to arrive at (what appeared to him as) a convincing 
conclusion.81 In this sense, the case of action and contemplation is not dissimilar from that of 
sovereignty, which also occupied Bodin for a considerable part of his career and led him from 
time to time to spectacular volte-faces that have recently found a new meaning by means of 
genetic analysis.82 Here as well, reopening Bodin’s laboratory has proven an exciting way to 
see the philosopher at work.  
 
                                                
81 Of course, we have no means of knowing that Bodin – had he lived longer – would not have changed his mind 
about his theory of reflection just as he had previously changed his mind about his theory of contemplation. 
However, in the Paradoxon he expresses the strong conviction that his theory of reflection solves long-standing 
difficulties in which he himself had previously remained involved. Given that these difficulties had been the motor 
of his continuing preoccupation with the question of action and contemplation, it seems that he would have had 
no reason to reconsider the question afterwards. He displayed very similar behaviour with regard to his definition 
of sovereignty, which he first attempted in a series of (now lost) short treatises from the late 1550s; made public 
in the Methodus of 1566; substantially revised in the Methodus of 1572; and completely overturned in the 
République of 1576. After 1576, even though he often went back to the République (both in French and, after 
1586, in Latin) to modify the text in fundamental ways, he never modified the definition of sovereignty again, 
evidently because he was satisfied with the solution found in 1576.  
82 See my “Introduction” in Bodin, Methodus, pp. 31-47; see also my article “Meaning in a Changing Context: 
Towards an Interdisciplinary Approach to Authorial Revision”, History of European Ideas 40/4 (2014): 474-494. 
